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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the insights that might be generated into the nature
of ‘lone wolf terrorism’ through the application of economic analysis. Orthodox approaches, par-
ticularly (standard) expected utility analysis and game theoretical analysis, are discussed. These
tools prove useful in developing preliminary or ‘first order’ insights. The lone wolf terrorist ex-
hibits a number of idiosyncrasies that present challenges to both economic analysis and govern-
ment security policy. An alternative analytical framework is constructed wherein a terroristic agent
makes choices on the basis of a preference ordering constructed over two moments of the distribu-
tion (measured in terms of fatalities generated by terrorist attacks). Seven predictions are yielded
from the mean-variance theoretical framework and numerical estimates are computed as prelim-
inary steps towards the full exploration of the implications of the framework. Most importantly,
depending on their level of risk aversion (or risk seeking behaviour), lone wolves are expected
to predominantly choose assassination, armed attack, bombing, hostage taking or unconventional
attacks. Furthermore, within a range of between one and two standard deviations from the mean,
it is possible that the quadratic utility function will reach a maximum. Following attacks of a
certain magnitude (in terms of fatalities), it might be expected that the lone wolf will withdraw
from activity for a period of time. This analytical approach may assist governments and security
agencies facing the threat of lone wolf terrorism.
KEYWORDS: lone wolf terrorism, economic analysis, expected utility, game theory, security,
mean-variance, assassination, armed attack, bombing, hostage taking
∗I would like to thank and acknowledge the three referees who provided valuable comments and
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Introduction 
 
…I am particularly concerned about loosely affiliated terrorists 
and lone offenders, which are inherently difficult to interdict 
given the anonymity of individuals that maintain limited or no 
links to established terrorist groups but act out of sympathy with 
a larger cause. We should not forget the Oklahoma City 
bombing in 1995, for example, which was carried out by 
individuals unaffiliated with a larger group — Robert S. Mueller 
III, Director, FBI1 
 
 
Theodore Kaczynski was the Unabomber. He was also a ‘lone wolf terrorist’ who 
acted alone and outside of a formal organisational or command structure. He 
killed three people and injured a further twenty-three. By contrast, the Weather 
Underground were responsible for one fatality, the Grey Wolves were responsible 
for one fatality and four injuries, the Symbionese Liberation Army were 
responsible for two fatalities and the Revolutionary Vanguard were responsible 
for eleven injuries2. True lone wolf terrorists are individuals who, like Theodore 
Kaczynski, operate alone, without accomplices and outside of a formal terrorist 
organisational or command structure. This is contrasted with ‘organised’ terrorism 
committed by individuals operating with the assistance and cooperation of others 
and within an organisational or command structure. The two types of terrorism 
are distinct. An analysis of lone wolf terrorism is important because, as the 
examples show, a lone wolf terrorist may be more deadly than a terrorist 
organisation.  
 The solitary nature of lone wolf terrorism is its most pernicious aspect and 
also the most important aspect to incorporate into a formal economic analysis of 
lone wolf terrorism. Traditional approaches to the economic analysis of terrorist 
behaviour have tended to concentrate on the ‘terrorist organisation’ as the unit of 
analysis. This makes sense. Although terrorism may be perpetrated by formally or 
informally affiliated groups and individuals, the terrorist organisation has been the 
typical originator of terroristic operations. It is, for example, to terrorist 
organisations and not affiliated individuals that fatalities and injuries are 
attributed within the GTD. The economic analysis of lone wolf terrorism therefore 
involves a refocussing of the analytical framework to encompass the terroristic 
behaviour of the lone individual with no formal ties to an organisation and, for 
                                                     
1 Mueller (2003).  
2 Data sourced from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).  
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true lone wolves, no accomplices3. The starting point is that lone wolves respond 
to incentives4. Payoffs and risks are weighed up and considered carefully in the 
choice of attack type and target. Innovations in the payoff-risk structure generate 
innovations in the behaviour of the lone wolf. The absence of an economic 
theoretical framework within which this particular aspect of lone wolf behaviour 
can be analysed is an important deficiency within modern defence economics.  
 When applied to terroristic organisations, the two main approaches of 
economic analysis of terrorism—expected utility theoretical and game theoretical 
approaches—have proven capable of generating important results. It is to be 
expected that, within a certain degree of approximation, the application of these 
orthodox models to lone wolf terrorism will generate some useful insights. There 
are, however, many challenges. Do game theoretical negotiation models make 
sense in the context of lone wolf terrorism? How is the lone wolf suicide terrorist 
to be encompassed within the analytical framework? What ‘scale’ of attack is 
likely to characterise the lone wolf terrorist? Does the manner in which the lone 
wolf allocates resources to different attack types differ from the terroristic 
organisation? Is public support for the cause of the lone wolf an important 
consideration? The lone wolf operates at the boundary of conventional economic 
analysis of terrorism. It is almost certainly the case that orthodox economic 
models of terrorism must be augmented to ensnare the lone wolf terrorist within 
an economic-analytical framework. In this paper, the orthodox model is applied 
and some possible innovations to the orthodox approach are suggested and 
worked out.  
 This paper is organised as follows. In Section II, a brief review of the 
relevant literature is presented. This sets the scene for the application of economic 
models to the analysis of lone wolf terrorism. In Section III, the possibility of 
obtaining useful insights into lone wolf terrorism through the application of 
expected utility theory and game theoretical analysis is explored. In Section IV, an 
economic-analytical framework that augments the orthodox or traditional 
approach to the economic analysis of terrorism is developed and seven predictions 
for lone wolf terrorism are derived. In Section V, a preliminary statistical analysis 
of the payoff-risk structure of individual attack methods is undertaken and some 
numerical content is provided for the predictions yielded in the previous section. 
Section VI concludes the paper.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
3 See Instituut voor Veiligheids en Crisismanagement (2007) and Spaaij (2010). A lone wolf, by 
definition, cannot be part of a group.  
4 See Ehrlich (1973, p.522).  
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The Economic Analysis of Terrorism 
 
Terrorism is, “the premeditated threatened or actual use of force or violence to 
attain a political goal through fear, coercion or intimidation” (Russell, Banker and 
Miller 1979, p.4)5. If the definition is augmented by highlighting the fact that the 
targets of the violence are “not directly involved with the policy making that the 
terrorists seek to influence” (Enders and Sandler 2002, pp.145-146), the definition 
may be said to contain all of the elements that are normally present in a definition 
of terrorism: (1) non-combatants are the targets of terrorist aggression; and (2) the 
terrorist action is expected to affect policy making indirectly by affecting the 
target audience of non-combatants (Victoroff 2005, p.4). A lone wolf terrorist 
engages in operations that are consistent with the definition of terrorism but does 
so outside of a formal command or organising structure. The lone wolf may or 
may not sympathise with a particular terroristic organisation and may not be 
motivated by a completely unique ideology or objective6. This is something quite 
different to the phenomenon that is sometimes referred to as ‘self-starter’ or 
autonomous cells, which operate without affiliation with an established terrorist 
network but may have an ideological affinity with the network (Kirby 2007). 
These are, however, groups of individuals and not lone wolves.  
 Rational actor models are applied by defence economists to the analysis of 
terroristic behaviour. Once an individual or group is terroristic7, rational actor 
models work from the assumption that the individual’s or group’s actions will be 
characterised by a rational pursuit of the relevant objective (subject to 
constraints). The application of rational actor models to extreme behaviour like 
terrorism may seem strange at first. However, terroristic behaviour is structured 
and strategic (Wilson 2000; Pape 2003) with politics apparently being a 
motivating factor for many terrorists (see della Porta 1992). Psychological and 
psychiatric analysis has not found robust evidence of irrationality or madness 
(Rasch 1979; Victoroff 2005) and the historical record of terroristic incidences is 
characterised by structure rather than randomness (see Mickolus (1980; 1983); 
Im, Cauley and Sandler (1987); Weimann and Brosius (1988); Enders, Parise and 
Sandler (1992); Enders and Sandler (2002) and Lee, Enders and Sandler (2009)). 
Although rational actor models supply just one part of the complete picture of 
terroristic motivation and behaviour, the application of such models to terrorism 
has yielded several important results: (1) the deterrence effect; (2) the substitution 
effect; (3) the endowment effect; and (4) the preference effect.  
                                                     
5 Cited in Sandler, Tschirhart and Cauley (1983, p.37).  
6 See Instituut voor Veiligheids en Crisismanagement (2007).  
7 The study of the causes of terroristic behaviour is multi-disciplinary. An example of an 
investigation of the links between terrorism and socio-economic variables is Berrebi (2007).  
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 First, terroristic agents or organisations may be deterred from undertaking 
a particular type of attack by the augmentation of security measures, for example, 
applied to particular targets. Landes (1978) demonstrates, within a rational choice 
expected utility framework, the impact of increased security (metal detectors) and 
harsher prison sentences on incidences of U.S. hijackings in the period 1961 to 
1976. Second, terroristic agents or organisations substitute other types of 
terroristic operations for those operations that have diminished expected utility 
because of enhanced security. For example, increased security at embassies 
decreases attacks on embassies but increases attacks outside embassy compounds 
(Enders and Sandler 1993; Frey and Luechinger 2003). Third, the resource 
endowment of terroristic organisations is an important variable and one that 
governments and their security agencies must target in order to reduce terrorism. 
Because of the deterrence and substitution effects, government security policy 
that focuses narrowly on particular types of terrorism may not reduce incidences 
of terroristic behaviour. Policies that produce a diminution in the terrorists’ 
resources are more likely to have ‘across-the-board’ effects (Sandler and Lapan 
1988; Enders and Sandler 2002). Fourth, the risk preferences of terroristic agents 
and organisations are of critical importance. For example, if the government 
increases its mean concession to terroristic organisations during negotiations, a 
risk-averse terrorist organisation will increase demands (Sandler, Tschirhart and 
Cauley 1983). The risk aversion of agents and organisations will likely have a 
significant impact on the occurrences and outcomes of terroristic incidences (see 
Phillips 2009; Phillips 2010; Phillips 2011). All of these results are derived from 
the rational choice expected utility model of terrorism.  
 Rational choice expected utility underlies game theoretical analysis of 
terrorism. Game theory8 is especially useful for analysing the strategic 
interactions of terroristic organisations and governments (Sandler and Arce M. 
2003; Arce M. and Sandler 2005). Several important results relevant to the 
negotiation process have been generated: (1) the determination of the sub-
optimality of the ‘never negotiate’ position (Sandler, Tschirhart and Cauley 
(1983); Atkinson, Sandler and Tschirhart (1987); Lapan and Sandler (1988)); (2) 
the discovery of the role that bargaining costs play in shaping the terrorist 
organisation’s demands, the concessions granted by the government and the 
duration of an incident (Atkinson, Sandler and Tschirhart (1987)); and (3) the 
discovery that constraints on terrorist organisations by ‘host states’ have an 
impact on the likelihood that a terrorist organisation will negotiate (Bapat 2006). 
In addition, game theory also generates important insights into the interactions 
between governments seeking to combat a terroristic enemy. For example: (1) the 
                                                     
8 The game theoretical analysis of terrorism may be roughly divided into three compartments: (1) 
models of government-terrorist negotiation; (2) models of government-terrorist-government 
interaction; (3) models incorporating another party, such as the ‘populace’.  
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choices by governments about the level of deterrence that will be applied to 
terrorism might result in too much or too little deterrence (Sandler and Lapan 
1988); and (2) the strength of support for terrorists’ causes is critical in shaping 
the nature of conflict (Siqueira and Sandler 2006; Bueno de Mesquita and 
Dickson 2007). The rigorous derivation of results that often highlight weaknesses 
in ‘conventional wisdom’ or intuition is a main advantage of game theoretical 
analysis9.  
 Within all of this economic analysis, the focus is predominantly upon the 
terroristic organisation and almost never directly upon the individual terroristic 
agent. This is not because the models cannot be applied to individual behaviour. 
Indeed, they have been constructed to be applied to the analysis of individual 
behaviour. It is just that certain aspects of terroristic behaviour (for example, 
negotiation processes) are more easily analysed when the terroristic organisation 
is the unit of analysis and other aspects of terroristic behaviour (for example, the 
suicide operations of individuals) are not easily captured within the orthodox 
analytical approach. The lone wolf terroristic agent inhabits the boundary of 
orthodox economic analysis of terrorism and it is the individualistic nature of the 
lone wolf that is the most pertinent characteristic. Lone wolf terrorists operate in a 
manner that is consistent with the definition of terrorism but engage in such 
behaviour without any direct links to a group or organisation. A lone wolf 
operates alone. The orthodox economic-analytical framework that has been 
applied to terrorism may be expected to generate results when applied to the lone 
wolf terroristic agent, especially if the utility function of the lone wolf is itself a 
function of an organisation with which the lone wolf sympathises. The 
individualistic nature of lone wolf terrorism may, however, demand more subtlety 
from any economic-theoretical framework that is applied to its analysis.  
 
Orthodox Economic Analysis of Lone Wolf Terrorism 
 
The application of a basic rational actor expected utility model to lone wolf is 
easy and yields immediate empirically testable results. It generates results by 
treating the lone wolf as a rational actor. It does not, however, penetrate very 
deeply into the nature of lone wolf terrorism. A lone wolf terrorist with no distinct 
sympathies for a particular terroristic organisation may be thought of as an 
individual attempting to maximise an expected utility function like the Becker 
(1968) or Ehrlich (1973) expected utility functions for criminal behaviour that 
were adapted to the analysis of hijacking by Landes (1978): 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )CZUPPSZUPPZUPEU cacaa −−+−+−= 11           (1) 
                                                     
9 Also see Bueno de Mesquita (2005), Jacobson and Kaplan (2007) and Sandler and Arce (2007).  
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 Where aP is the probability of apprehension, cP is the conditional 
probability of conviction if apprehended, Z represents the lone wolf’s payoff, S is 
the negative payoff of a prison sentence and C  represents the costs associated 
with apprehension when the lone wolf is not sentenced (see Landes 1978, pp.5-6). 
Such a model encapsulates the deterrence effect. In assessing a target or attack 
type, the lone wolf weighs the probability of success against the probability of 
capture and conviction. Harsher sentences or enhanced security around particular 
targets will decrease the EU associated with such targets and deter the lone wolf.   
 
Lone Wolf Terrorism Prediction 1: The implementation of 
higher security and harsher penalties may be expected to deter 
the lone wolf from a particular target or attack type.  
 
 The weakness of a model such as the one depicted in Equation (1) is that it 
ultimately says very little about the lone wolf. The ‘deterrence’ result has value 
when assessing a particular target or attack type or a terroristic group but its value 
does not translate well to the context of the lone wolf. Prediction (1) should still 
be expected to hold. However, the lone wolf places a more onerous burden on 
security agencies and analysts. Unlike the ‘stream’ of hijackers analysed by 
Landes (1978), lone wolves who plan their operations independently may 
generate a series of ‘point attacks’ characterised by ‘once-off’ particular attack 
types on particular targets. Security agencies may impose the deterrence effect 
upon a lone wolf by correctly anticipating a target or attack type (or by imposing 
harsher punishments). The single attempted or actual strike by a single lone wolf 
on a single (unanticipated) target is not, unfortunately, effectively modelled with a 
basic model that has an emphasis on deterrence (such as Equation (1)).  
 A rational actor model that incorporates both the deterrence and 
substitution effects is more flexible. Equation (1) can be thought of as being 
applied to a particular target or attack type. The lone wolf then applies Equation 
(1) to a number of alternatives and chooses the alternative that provides the 
highest expected utility. The lone wolf will substitute one target or attack type for 
another as he re-ranks the alternatives in light of changing conditions. Adapting 
Equation (1) to explicitly incorporate other targets or attack types is 
straightforward:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]∑
=
−−+−+−=
N
i
iicaiicaia CZUPPSZUPPZUPEU iiiii
1
11          (2) 
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 In Equation (2), the subscript, i, indicates that the lone wolf’s EU is the 
sum of utility across each terroristic (or non-terroristic) operation i. If the lone 
wolf acts as if he maximises EU, innovations in the utility structure of individual 
operations affect EU. The lone wolf may be deterred from a particular operation 
but attracted to another. The model depicted in Equation (2) is not entirely 
satisfactory but it does explicitly encapsulate both deterrence and substitution 
effects within a single time period. It is also a slightly more useful representation 
of the lone wolf’s decision calculus. By construction, the model depicted in 
Equation (2) can more effectively handle the ‘point attacks’ that might 
characterise lone wolves, even if only to the extent that the lone wolf may be 
expected to rank possible targets or attack types, to re-rank them as circumstances 
change and to choose only the best ranked feasible alternative.  
 
Lone Wolf Terrorism Prediction 2: The implementation of 
higher security and harsher penalties may be expected to deter 
the lone wolf from a particular target or attack type and cause 
him to substitute one type of attack for another.  
 
 The weakness of the model is that its analytical power does not extend far 
enough into the domain of the lone wolf. Attack types or targets that are not 
feasible or highly ranked within a preference ordering are not undertaken. Within 
a single time period, the lone wolf must strike with ‘point attacks’ rather than 
combinations of attack methods and targets. The deterrence and substitution 
effects of prediction (2) must still be expected to hold. However, security agencies 
viewing the lone wolf through the analytical filter of Equation (2) are left with 
little advance over Equation (1) and must still anticipate the lone wolf’s ‘points of 
attack’. The problem is essentially one of non-revealed preference. A single lone 
wolf who does not engage in a particular operation might be revealing that such 
an operation has been accorded inferior ranking within his preference ordering or 
he might be revealing no such thing. On the contrary, the operation may be 
planned and ready to execute. Because of the ‘point attack’ nature of lone wolf 
terrorism, it is only after a preference has been revealed that Equation (2) 
becomes more useful to security agencies.  
 The theme of the forgoing discussion is the independent and individual 
nature of lone wolf terrorism generates a series of ‘point attacks’ which are 
difficult to analyse within the standard utility theoretical framework. Deterrence 
and substitution effects should still be expected to hold for any rational actor but 
the guidance for security agencies that can be extracted from the analytical 
framework is thin because of non-revealed preferences. This stands in 
contradistinction to a terroristic organisation that might more readily (1) reveal 
preferences through propaganda (for example, Bin Laden’s fatwa); or (2) fall into 
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the structure of terroristic incidences revealed in the time series. The individual 
nature of the lone wolf also presents problems for the application of the 
‘endowment effect’. The resources and infrastructure of a terroristic organisation 
may subject to a diminution that can be expected to produce a diminution in 
terroristic incidences. Likewise, a diminution in the resources endowment of the 
lone wolf knocks particular attack types or targets out of the lone wolf’s feasible 
set and may temporarily render all attack types and targets infeasible.  
 
Lone Wolf Terrorism Prediction 3: A diminution in the 
resources endowment of the lone wolf can be expected to 
produce a diminution in lone wolf terroristic activity.  
 
 The individual and, presumably, largely self sufficient nature of the lone 
wolf again presents analytical challenges. If security agencies can strike a lone 
wolf’s resource endowment, it would seem likely that under such circumstances 
both the identity and location of the lone wolf is known and he may be 
permanently decommissioned. If not, of course, it seems unlikely that the resource 
endowment may be struck in any direct way. Security agencies operating with the 
guidance of the orthodox economic analytical framework must focus on across 
the board measures that make resources (for example, bomb-making equipment) 
more difficult to source. The analytical framework and the endowment effect do 
not translate easily to the individual and self sufficient context of the lone wolf.  
 The risk preferences of the lone wolf are of critical importance. The level 
of risk aversion10 exhibited by the terrorist shapes the choice of attack type and 
target. Furthermore, if the lone wolf becomes involved in a negotiation or 
bargaining process with the government and its security agencies, the risk 
preferences that the lone wolf exhibits will certainly shape his actions within such 
a process. An increase in the risk the lone wolf associates with particular targets 
or attack types may produce both deterrence and substitution effects unless the 
increased risk is accompanied by an increase in the expected payoff.  
 
Lone Wolf Terrorism Prediction 4: An increase in the risk 
associated with the payoffs of a particular terroristic operation 
will deter the lone wolf from undertaking the operation unless 
there is a commensurate increase in the expected payoffs.  
 
                                                     
10 Risk aversion rather than risk seeking behaviour is the starting point because risk seeking 
behaviour unrealistically implies that the terrorist will give up units of payoff to take on more risk. 
Risk aversion more realistically implies that the terrorist will take on any amount of risk as long as 
the payoff is high enough. Of course, if the terrorist does happen to be risk seeking we may say 
that he has negative risk aversion.  
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 The risk preference effect does not suffer from the same lack of 
transferability to the lone wolf context. This is because the lone wolf cannot 
escape the distribution of payoffs that characterises terroristic operations in 
general. The payoffs and the variability or risk of the payoffs to terroristic 
operations, particularly if measured in terms of human tragedy (number of 
fatalities) or media coverage (which is most likely a function of the level of 
human tragedy), are encapsulated in a probability distribution that applies to all 
terroristic organisations. Only innovations in attack type and target not reflected 
within the distribution are unrestrained by the distribution. Governments and their 
security agencies may therefore determine the payoffs and risks associated with 
particular terroristic operations, regardless of whether they are perpetrated by an 
individual or group. Security measures that enhance the risk (without increasing 
expected payoffs) associated with particular targets and attack types generate 
deterrence and substitution effects. However, within a payoff-risk framework the 
idiosyncrasies of the lone wolf do not interfere with the analytical determination 
of the strength of these effects. Within a payoff-risk framework, the lone wolf is 
constrained by the probability distribution of payoffs to terrorism. The risk 
preference effect is durable when the lone wolf is considered within a payoff-risk 
analytical framework.  
 Within a game theoretical structure, the interactions between governments 
or between security agencies of a single government, regarding deterrence 
measures should still hold in the context of lone wolf terrorism. A lone wolf need 
not operate within a domicile and might, for instance, perpetrate an attack aboard 
an aircraft that he has boarded outside of the jurisdiction of the target country. 
The deterrence and pre-emption decisions of each of two different target countries 
may have implications for the other country (see Arce M. and Sandler (2005, 
p.186)) in the context of lone wolf terrorism but this, of course, does not provide 
any additional insights or predictions that deeply address the idiosyncrasies of the 
phenomenon. Although a particular type of pre-emption or deterrence may be 
required for lone wolves, the interactions of governments in executing such 
actions seem likely to follow similar patterns to those revealed by game 
theoretical analysis of terrorism. It is unclear but unlikely that a lone wolf threat 
would be treated differently by governments than the threat of the terroristic 
organisation.  
 
Lone Wolf Terrorism Prediction 5: The lone wolf terrorist 
presents challenges similar to the terroristic group with regard to 
the coordination of security policy between governments.  
 
 A lone wolf might engage in negotiations with a government, particularly 
if the activity involves a hostage-taking situation. The strategic interactions 
9
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between governments and lone wolves are likely to follow similar patterns to 
those identified by historical analysis and game theoretical analysis if a 
negotiation process emerges. In this instance, the lone wolf has almost no defining 
idiosyncrasies and game theoretical analysis as it has been worked out in the 
context of terroristic organisations may be expected to function.  
 
Lone Wolf Terrorism Prediction 6: The lone wolf terrorist has 
no defining idiosyncrasies within a negotiation or bargaining 
context.  
 
 Game theoretical analysis applies more easily to both the lone wolf and 
terroristic organisation than expected utility analysis. This applies to models of 
government-government interaction and government-terrorist interaction. Models 
incorporating a third party, such as ‘popular support’, may be more complex when 
explored within a lone wolf terrorism context. It seems clear that the ‘popular 
support’ modelled in game theoretical analysis of terrorism does not apply with 
any significant direct force within the lone wolf context. In such models, popular 
support for terrorism emerges from (1) economic damage caused by counter-
terror operations; (2) the assessment by the population of the government’s 
counter-terror operations; (3) the diversion of government money to counter-
terrorism (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson (2007) and Siqueira and Sandler 
(2006)). The lone wolf is unlikely to precipitate counter-terror operations that 
galvanise public support against the government in the manner envisaged within 
the extant game theoretical analysis. As such, no predictions for lone wolf 
terrorism from the existing theory can be garnered on this point.   
 The application of orthodox economic analysis yields several conclusions 
for lone wolf terrorism. The main insights that have been reached by the 
application of economic analysis to terrorism may usually be expected to hold in 
some way or another when applied to lone wolf terrorism. Governments and 
security agencies that face the threat of lone wolf terrorism do not do so without 
the benefit of an existing analytical framework. However, the individual, 
independent and self-sufficient nature of true lone wolf terrorists presents 
obstacles to the depth of insight that can be gathered by an application of 
orthodox methods. The realisation that even true lone wolves are constrained by 
the distribution of payoffs that characterises terrorism is a point of traction that 
might be exploited to generate deeper results that may be implemented in an 
operational sense by governments and security agencies. An analytical framework 
within which the predictions of the orthodox model hold but which, at the same 
time, encompasses the idiosyncrasies of the lone wolf will provide much more 
tangible analytical guidance to governments and security agencies.  
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A Mean-Variance Framework 
 
An analytical framework that exploits the constraint placed upon the lone wolf 
terrorist by the distribution of payoffs to terrorist incidences is a mean-variance 
preference ordering framework. Within this framework, lone wolves order their 
preferences for particular attack types or targets based only on two moments of 
the distribution: (1) the mean (expected payoff); and (2) the variance (risk) of the 
payoffs. Because the lone wolf cannot escape the distribution of payoffs that 
characterises terrorist incidences, the application of a mean-variance framework 
to lone wolf terrorism may provide computable results—insights into lone 
wolves’ preference orderings—that cannot be attained by any other method. The 
method is a rational actor model but one that places a less onerous burden on both 
the agent and the economist seeking to analyse the agent’s behaviour. A mean-
variance preference ordering is likely to coincide approximately with any 
preference ordering constructed with full EU methods. If the agent is assumed to 
be characterised by a quadratic utility function, the agent’s mean-variance 
preference ordering will be precisely consistent with a full EU ordering. 
 Although a mean-variance preference ordering may be constructed over 
any aspect of terroristic behaviour—media coverage, public support, financial 
payoffs—the most immediately obvious payoff is the level of human tragedy—
fatalities and injuries. Furthermore, the level of human tragedy is the first and 
most important statistic reported by the press and, at the very least, is likely to 
represent a very plausible proxy for the more intangible ‘political influence’ that 
is usually considered to be the ultimate objective of terrorists. In many ways, the 
level of human tragedy determines the amount of coverage and attention an 
incident receives. This tends to facilitate the dissemination, although 
approximately, of the distribution of fatalities associated with particular attack 
methods and targets and recent evidence strongly supports the assumption that 
terrorists act to maximise the level of human tragedy. The individual arrested for 
the Washington D.C. Metro bombing conspiracy explicitly stated this as the 
objective (Finn, Hsu and Gibson 2010). The assumption that terrorists act to 
maximise the level of human tragedy is also in accordance with the very 
interesting finding that the number of victims in a particular attack is correlated 
with the number of victims of previous attacks, implying a ‘contest in brutality’ 
among terrorist groups (Caruso and Schneider 2010).  
 
Assumption 1 The lone wolf makes a preference ordering of 
combinations of attack methods on the basis of two moments of 
the distribution of the fatalities associated with the particular 
attack method combinations.  
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 The utility of the lone wolf is a function of the mean (expected) fatalities, 
F, and risk (the standard deviation of the possible divergence of fatalities from the 
mean). Formally,  
 ( )FFfU σ,=                 (3) 
 
 The lone wolf terrorist faces the task of constructing a preference ordering 
based upon the mean and variance of the fatalities associated with particular 
attack methods. If the lone wolf can combine attack methods, the lone wolf faces 
the task of constructing a preference ordering across combinations of attack 
methods. The expected payoff of a combination of attack methods may be stated 
as: 
 
∑
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The risk or variance of the expected payoff of a combination of attack methods 
may be stated as: 
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 Where ijρ  is the correlation coefficient that expresses the degree of 
correlation between the fatalities generated by attack method i and attack method  
j and wi is the proportion of resources allocated to attack method i. It should also 
be noted that jiij σσρ  is equal to the covariance between attack methods i and j ( )ijσ . The double summation sign simply implies that all possible pairs of attack 
methods must be accounted for.  
 Within this framework, the lone wolf will consider the set of attack 
method combinations that have the highest payoff for each level of risk. The set 
of attack method combinations that have the highest payoff for each level of risk 
is the ‘efficient set’. The efficient set may be determined by repeatedly solving the 
relevant quadratic programming problem (Strong 2006, p.155): 
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Subject to a target *F : 
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And the constraints: 
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 The constitution of the efficient set is important information for 
governments and their security agencies (see Phillips 2009). Because the lone 
wolf is constrained by the distribution of payoffs that characterises terroristic 
incidences, the lone wolf who constructs a preference ordering of attack methods 
on the basis of mean and variance is drawn to the efficient set of attack method 
combinations. Governments and their security agencies have a much narrower set 
of potential attack method combinations upon which to focus their attention and 
efforts when the lone wolf is analysed through the filter of a mean-variance 
preference ordering framework. A distinguishing feature of lone wolf terrorism is 
its lone individual nature. It would seem unlikely, at least within a single period, 
that a lone wolf could deploy a combination of attack methods (for example, a 
combination of bombing, assassination and armed assault). What is far more 
likely is that the lone wolf will deploy a single attack method within a period of 
analysis. The lone wolf is further constrained to the set of combinations within the 
efficient set that contain just one attack method. It is to one of these single attack 
method combinations that the lone wolf will devote resources in a single period. 
Formally, 
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Subject to a target *F : 
                 (7) 
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And the constraint: 
 
1≤iw  
 
 A mean-variance preference ordering over attack methods does not require 
the assignment of a utility function. However, further insights can be obtained 
from doing so. The assignment of a quadratic utility function guarantees the 
consistency of any mean-variance preference ordering with the NM axioms. 
Although there has been strong debate regarding the deployment of quadratic 
utility functions within financial economics, a quadratic utility function will 
closely (locally) approximate other utility functions and closely approximate a full 
EU preference ordering with less computational burden and with the advantage of 
yielding computable results (the constituents of a rational actor’s preference 
ordering) (see Elton et al. (2003, p.232); Kroll, Levy and Markowitz (1984); Levy 
and Markowitz (1979); Meyer (1987) and, for a discussion of theoretical 
considerations, especially the utilisation of mean-variance orderings for portfolio 
problems and the selection of the optimal choice, Baron (1977, p.1690-1692)). 
The assignment of a quadratic utility function provides the mechanism by which 
the risk preferences of the lone wolf may be analysed within the mean-variance 
analytical framework. Not only will such an analytical apparatus provide 
computable results relevant to the analysis of lone wolf terrorism that will closely 
approximate any full EU analysis but the special features of quadratic utility 
might be particularly useful for the analysis of the lone wolf.  
 Formally, the specific functional form of the utility function that emerges 
from a situation where the terroristic agent with quadratic utility makes choices 
solely on the basis of two moments of the distribution (mean and variance) of 
payoffs may be expressed formally as: 
 ( ) 2dFaFcFU −+=                (8) 
 
 If the terroristic agent happens, for a given payoff, to prefer a smaller 
variance of payoffs to a larger variance, then 0>d . The application of a 
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quadratic utility function has a number of distinct advantages. A quadratic utility 
function permits the analysis of the effect of the risk aversion parameters on the 
utility generated by particular payoffs. It will do so in a manner that will locally 
approximate other specifications of utility functions. A number of additional 
insights into lone wolf terrorism may be generated by the application of quadratic 
utility. The features of quadratic utility that are most important and relevant are 
listed below: 
 
1. The quadratic utility function ensures that the equilibrium weights 
assigned to particular attack methods by lone wolf terrorists are not 
influenced by the finiteness of the mean and variance of the attack method 
combinations (see Ohlson 1977). Analysis may proceed, for example, 
even when lone wolf terrorists are assumed to face infinite risk.   
2. The quadratic utility function must reach a maximum at some point. This 
is a problem within financial economics but not for defence economics. 
Beyond some point, additional expected fatalities at a constant risk level 
will result in a reduction in the allocation of resources to risky attack 
method combinations (see Wippern 1971). This diminishing marginal 
utility of fatalities past some point ensures that the mean-variance 
framework is consistent with the accepted definitions of terrorism.  
3. The question of the location (within the range of payoffs) of the satiation 
point is an important one. It is possible that satiation occurs within a 
relevant (not extreme) range of payoffs to attack method combinations. In 
this case, whether satiation is interpreted as encompassing some political 
aspect of terrorism beyond merely accumulating fatalities or as something 
that occurs at a moment of self-destruction, large or extreme payoffs—
payoffs that are many standard deviations from the mean—are not 
necessarily required to entice the lone wolf. Governments and their 
security agencies may confine their analysis to the distribution of payoffs 
to terrorism.  
 
 The theoretical-analytical framework that has been set down in this section 
yields a number of predictions for the lone wolf terrorist. The predictions that are 
generated from this particular analytical framework encompass those of the 
orthodox expected utility approach to the analysis of terrorism. However, the 
implications are more precise and computable results relevant to the set of attack 
method combinations from which the rational lone wolf will select are obtainable. 
The predictions that are yielded from the mean-variance analytical framework 
with quadraticity of the lone wolf terrorist’s utility function are listed below. Each 
prediction is accompanied by an example or interpretation in order to add more 
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concreteness to the predictions and provide an indication of their practical 
application and relevance.  
 
Prediction 1 The lone wolf terrorist will be deterred from 
engaging in terroristic activity by an augmentation in the 
variance of the expected payoffs.  
 
Interpretation Lone wolf activity will decrease when the lone 
wolf perceives an increase in the variability of the fatalities that 
can be expected from an attack (and vice versa). For example, 
random screening of packages delivered to all government 
departments will likely increase the variability of the fatalities 
that the lone wolf can expect from a ‘letter bombing’ campaign. 
Publicised security alerts that heighten awareness among targets 
will also likely have the same effect.  
 
Prediction 2 The lone wolf terrorist will reorder his preferences 
for attack method combinations on the basis of changes to the 
two moments of the distribution of payoffs.  
 
Interpretation When there is a change in either the expected 
fatalities and/or the variability of the expected fatalities 
associated with a particular attack method (or combination), the 
lone wolf will change his preferences for that attack method. For 
example, news of a bombing campaign that generates an 
inordinate number of fatalities may increase the expected 
fatalities associated with bombing and reposition the attack 
method at a higher position in the lone wolf’s preference 
ranking.  
 
Prediction 3 An increase (decrease) in the risk aversion of the 
lone wolf will induce a preference re-ordering. Likewise, an 
increase (decrease) in the risk (the second moment of the 
distribution) will induce a preference re-ordering.  
 
Interpretation The quadraticity of the lone wolf’s utility 
function implies that the lone wolf will be observed to allocate 
more resources (including time) to the less risky attack methods 
(or combinations) as his recorded fatalities and injuries increase.  
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Prediction 4 Lone wolf terrorists will choose attack method 
combinations that are contained within the efficient set of 
combinations (those that have the highest expected payoff for a 
given level of risk). 
 
Interpretation The lone wolf will be observed to deploy (or 
exhibit a tendency to deploy) the attack methods (or 
combinations) that dominate others in terms of expected 
fatalities for a given level of risk. These attack method 
combinations are computable. This represents valuable 
information to the government and its security agencies.  
 
Prediction 5 Lone wolf terrorists, at least within a single period 
of analysis, will choose attack method combinations that are 
constituted by a single attack method. 
 
Interpretation Lone wolf terrorists, for the reasons explained 
above, will choose single attack methods at particular points in 
time. This follows logically from the nature of the lone wolf.  
 
Prediction 6 Past some point, the lone wolf terrorist may 
experience decreasing marginal utility from fatalities generated 
by attacks.  
 
Interpretation After some period of success, the lone wolf will 
be observed to reduce or cease his activity. He may resume 
again after some time has elapsed.  
 
Prediction 7 The lone wolf will be found to inhabit a relevant 
range of the distribution of payoffs to terroristic incidences.  
 
Interpretation The lone wolf need not be attracted to the 
extreme tails of the distribution or to activity that sits outside of 
the distribution of fatalities associated with terrorist activity in 
general. Lone wolves may be satisfied by very low levels of 
fatalities and engage in terrorist activities that place them well 
within the probability distribution of fatalities.  
 
 The insight that the lone wolf is subject to and constrained by the 
probability distribution of payoffs and risks that characterises terroristic 
operations and the durability of the risk preference effect is of critical importance. 
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It provides the opening for the construction of a theoretical framework that 
encompasses the individual and ‘point attack’ nature of lone wolf terrorism and 
generates insights into the payoff-risk tradeoffs that will bait the lone wolf. The 
predictions of the orthodox model will hold in such a framework but in a manner 
that provides much more tangible analytical guidance to governments and their 
security agencies within the context of the lone wolf. A mean-variance preference 
ordering approach to the analysis of terrorism enhances the traditional or orthodox 
approaches to the expected utility analysis of terrorism and generates computable 
results that may assist governments and security agencies in their pursuit of both 
terrorists associated with terrorist organisations and the insidious lone wolves.   
 
Statistical Analysis and the Lone Wolf’s Single Attack Method Combinations 
 
The analysis of the lone wolf within a mean-variance framework commences with 
the identification of the properties of the distribution of terroristic incidences and, 
in particular, the payoffs and risks associated with attack methods. Using the 
RAND Corporation’s data for terroristic incidences (the MIPT database), the 
average payoff and the risk associated with each of ten attack methods may be 
computed for the period 1968 to 2007. The ten attack method types covered by 
RAND are (1) armed attacks; (2) arson; (3) assassination; (4) hostage; (5) 
bombing; (6) hijacking; (7) kidnapping; (8) ‘other’; (9) unconventional11; and (10) 
‘unknown’. Of all of these attack methods, bombing, unconventional and hostage 
taking incidences have the highest risk and also the highest level of expected 
fatalities per attack per year.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
11 The 9/11 terrorist attacks represent the most prominent recorded incidents of this class in the 
RAND-MIPT database. A nuclear or biological attack would be recorded as ‘unconventional’ 
were such an attack to occur.  
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Table 1. Statistical Summary 1967 to 2007 of Attack Methods 
Attack Method Variance Standard Deviation Average Annual 
Fatalities Per 
Incident 
Armed Attack 1.261 1.122 1.296 
Arson 0.565 0.7519 0.322 
Assassination 0.15 0.3877 1.045 
Hostage 135.79 11.653 3.62 
Bombing 28.311 5.32 4.604 
Hijacking 14.816 3.8491 1.566 
Kidnapping 0.113 0.3355 0.393 
Other 3.756 1.9379 0.473 
Unconventional 576.281 24.005 3.883 
Unknown 16.028 4.003 0.915 
 
 The lone wolf terrorist cannot escape this distribution. Combinations of 
these attack methods form the choice set from which terrorists and terroristic 
organisations choose. From the complete choice set, lone wolves and terroristic 
organisations select from those attack method combinations that have the highest 
expected payoff for a particular level of risk. That is, from the efficient set of 
attack method combinations that solve the quadratic programming problem 
outline in the previous section. Phillips (2009) presents calculations of the 
efficient set using the RAND data. Attack method combinations that constitute the 
efficient set are characterised by their weighting schedules (resource allocations). 
For example, 50 percent armed assault, 10 percent kidnapping, 30 percent 
bombing and 10 percent assassination. Unlike a terroristic organisation, the lone 
wolf, at least within a single period, is more likely to be constrained at each given 
level of risk to the corner combinations that contain a single attack method. The 
determination of these ‘single attack method’ combinations is undertaken in this 
section.  
 For each of the attack methods listed above, the RAND data for a forty-
year period is utilised to compute the expected payoff for individual attack 
methods over a range of standard deviations and the weight (percentage of 
resources that would be devoted to the attack method) accorded to the individual 
attack method at each standard deviation. For each attack method, the weight and 
expected payoff at levels of standard deviation ranging from 0.05 fatalities per 
attack per year to 11.5 fatalities per attack per year are computed. Formally, a 
range of values for Equation (9) were established. 
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 Equation (9) is the equation for the standard deviation (risk) of a single 
attack method, i. For the range of values for Equation (9), the expected payoffs of 
combinations consisting of single attack method at particular weights were 
computed. The following quadratic programming problem, which is essentially 
equivalent to the problem above, was solved over the range of standard deviations 
for attack method combinations consisting of single attack methods (i = 1): 
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And the constraint: 
 
1≤iw  
 
 The results of the calculations are presented in Tables Two and Three. The 
range of standard deviations is contained within the first column. For each attack 
method, i, the weight (percentage of resources) and expected payoff that is 
consistent with each level of standard deviation is presented. For example, at a 
standard deviation of 0.055416418 fatalities per attack per year, five percent 
(0.05) of resources allocated to ‘armed attack’ generates an expected payoff of 
0.064804 fatalities per attack per year.  
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Table 2. The Lone Wolf’s Efficient Set of ‘Single Attack Method’ Combinations, Part One 
 Armed 
Attack 
 Hostage  Arson  Assassination  
Standard 
Deviation 
Weight Payoff Weight Payoff Weight Payoff Weight Payoff 
0.055416418 0.05 0.064804 0.004817528 0.01743797 0.074658651 0.024024957 0.144797319 0.151244 
0.110832836 0.1 0.129609 0.009635231 0.03487657 0.149321343 0.048051214 0.28959725 0.302491 
0.221665672 0.2 0.259217 0.019270374 0.069752825 0.298639991 0.09610156 0.579189275 0.604977 
0.332498507 0.3 0.388826 … … 0.447961334 0.144152774 0.868783912 0.907466 
0.443331343 0.4 0.518434 … … 0.59728133 0.192203554 1 1.044524 
0.554164179 0.5 0.648043 … … 0.746599978 0.240253901 … … 
0.664997015 0.6 0.777652 … … 0.895919974 0.288304681 … … 
0.775829851 0.7 0.90726 … … … … … … 
0.886662686 0.8 1.036869 … … … … … … 
0.997495522 0.9 1.166477 … … … … … … 
1.108328358 1 1.296086 0.096352393 0.348766013 … … … … 
1.150287317 … … 0.1 0.361969227 … … … … 
2.300574634 … … 0.2 0.723938455 … … … … 
3.450861951 … … 0.3 1.085907682 … … … … 
4.601149269 … … 0.4 1.447876909 … … … … 
5.751436586 … … 0.5 1.809846137 … … … … 
6.901723903 … … 0.6 2.171815364 … … … … 
8.05201122 … … 0.7 2.533784591 … … … … 
9.202298537 … … 0.8 2.895753819 … … … … 
10.35258585 … … 0.9 3.257723046 … … … … 
11.50287317 … … 1 3.619692274 … … … … 
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Table 3. The Lone Wolf’s Efficient Set of ‘Single Attack Method’ Combinations, Part Two 
 Bombing  Hijack  Kidnapping  Other  Unconventional  
Standard 
Deviation 
Weight Payoff Weight Payoff Weight Payoff Weight Payoff Weight Payoff 
0.055416418 0.010551226 0.048577268 0.01458 0.02283 0.167320596 0.06569 0.02896 0.01370331 0.002338632 0.00908 
0.110832836 0.021102452 0.097154536 0.02917 0.04567 0.334641192 0.13139 0.05793 0.02740613 0.004677305 0.01816 
0.221665672 0.042204904 0.194309073 0.05834 0.09134 0.669282384 0.26279 0.11587 0.05481226 0.009354526 0.03632 
0.332498507 0.063307356 0.291463609 0.08751 0.13701 1 0.39264 0.17381 0.08221864 0.014031832 0.05449 
0.443331343 0.084409999 0.388619022 0.11668 0.18268 … … … … 0.018709095 0.07265 
0.554164179 0.105512261 0.485772681 0.14585 0.22836 … … … … 0.023386316 0.09081 
0.664997015 0.126614713 0.582927218 0.17502 0.27403 … … … … 0.028063579 0.10898 
0.775829851 0.147717165 0.680081754 0.20419 0.31970 … … … … 0.032740842 0.12714 
0.886662686 0.168819617 0.77723629 0.23336 0.36537 … … … … 0.037418148 0.14530 
0.997495522 0.189922069 0.874390826 0.26253 0.41105 … … … … 0.042095369 0.16347 
1.108328358 0.211024331 0.971544486 0.29170 0.45672 … … … … 0.046772674 0.18163 
1.150287317 0.219013652 1.008326884 0.30274 0.47401 … … 0.6013 0.28443647 0.048543387 0.18851 
2.300574634 0.438026924 2.016652016 0.60549 0.94802 … … 1 0.47303341 0.097086689 0.37702 
3.450861951 0.657040386 3.024978024 0.90824 1.42203 … … … … 0.145630075 0.56553 
4.601149269 0.875835029 4.032296598 1 1.56569 … … … … 0.19417342 0.75404 
5.751436586 1 4.603949943 … … … … … … 0.242716764 0.94255 
6.901723903 … … … … … … … … 0.291260066 1.13106 
8.05201122 … … … … … … … … 0.339803453 1.31957 
9.202298537 … … … … … … … … 0.388346797 1.50808 
10.35258585 … … … … … … … … 0.436890142 1.69659 
11.50287317 … … … … … … … … 0.485433444 1.8851 
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 Of interest to the defence economist (and governments and their security 
agencies) are those combinations of attack methods that constitute the efficient 
set. When considering the lone wolf terroristic agent, attack method combinations 
in a single period will contain just one attack method. The ability to diversify 
within a single period is unlikely to be a defining characteristic of the lone wolf. 
Of most interest, therefore, are those attack methods that dominate others at 
particular levels of risk. For example, consider the first row of Table Two. At a 
standard deviation of 0.055416418 fatalities per attack per year, a feasible—that 
is, a positive weighting of equal or less than 100 percent of resources—allocation 
of 0.14479 (14 percent) of resources to assassination dominates (has a higher 
expected payoff) armed attacks, arson and hostage taking. At each level of risk 
throughout the range of standard deviations of 0.05 fatalities per attack per year to 
11.5 fatalities per attack per year, particular attack methods dominate others by 
having a higher expected payoff at the particular level of risk. The set of all such 
attack methods and risk levels constitutes the efficient set from which the rational 
lone wolf may be expected to choose. 
 At lower levels of risk—in the range of standard deviations of 0.05 
fatalities per attack per year to 0.44 fatalities per attack per year—assassination 
dominates all other attack methods. At lower levels of risk, the lone wolf’s 
efficient set must contain ‘assassination’. At intermediate levels of risk—in the 
range of standard deviations of 0.55 fatalities per attack per year to 1.10 fatalities 
per attack per year—armed attack dominates all other attack methods. For less 
risk averse lone wolf terrorists, armed attack constitutes the efficient set at 
intermediate risk levels. At high levels of risk—in the range of standard 
deviations of 1.15 fatalities per attack per year to 5.75 fatalities per attack per 
year—bombing dominates all other attack methods. At very high levels of risk—
in the range of standard deviations of 6.90 fatalities per attack per year to 11.50 
fatalities per attack per year—hostage taking dominates all other attack methods. 
At extreme levels of risk—in the range of standard deviations of 11.50 fatalities 
per attack per year to 24.00 fatalities per attack per year—unconventional attacks 
dominate all other attack methods. When the overall range of risk levels that are 
possible with single attack methods is broken down into low, intermediate, high, 
very high levels and extreme it becomes very clear that the dominant attack 
methods within each risk level are assassination, armed attack, bombing, hostage 
taking and unconventional methods.  
 The implications of the analysis are clear and add numerical content to 
some of the predictions of the mean-variance framework presented in the previous 
section. First, the lone wolf should be found to inhabit a risk-payoff range of 
between 0.05 fatalities per attack per year with an expected payoff of 0.15 
fatalities per attack per year (assassination) and 24.00 fatalities per attack per year 
with an expected payoff of 3.83 fatalities per attack per year (unconventional) 
23
Phillips: Lone Wolf Terrorism
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
(prediction 7). Second, depending on the lone wolf’s risk aversion, the lone wolf 
should be found within a single period to be characterised by an attack method 
combination consisting solely of assassination, armed attack, bombing, hostage 
taking or unconventional methods (predictions 4 and 5). Changes to risk aversion 
or changes in the risk-payoff structure will invoke the deterrence and substitution 
effects (predictions 1, 2 and 3). Governments and their security agencies, in 
addition to their current practices, might find some utility in devoting resources to 
the dominant attack methods identified by the analysis. It is worth noting that the 
risk-payoff range for a reasonably risk averse lone wolf is located at a very low 
level. A lone wolf can be expected to inhabit the range characterised by an 
expected payoff of only 0.15 fatalities per attack per year (with a standard 
deviation of 0.05).  
 Although further analysis is necessary to determine the satiation points for 
lone wolves exhibiting quadratic utility and varying levels of risk aversion, there 
is reason to expect that satiation points (maxima of the utility functions) will be 
found at small standard deviations from the mean (see Wippern 1971) (prediction 
6). If this happened to be the case for lone wolf terroristic agents, a risk averse 
lone wolf terroristic agent operating within the lowest range of standard 
deviations and devoting, for example, 100 percent of resources to assassination, 
might experience satiation at a level of fatalities between one and two standard 
deviations from the mean. In this case, satiation could occur at 1.04 fatalities per 
attack per year + 0.44 to 0.88 fatalities per attack per year. A less risk averse lone 
wolf terroristic agent operating within the high range of standard deviations and 
devoting, for example, 100 percent of resources to bombing, might experience 
satiation at a level of fatalities between one and two standard deviations from the 
mean. In this case, satiation could occur at 4.60 fatalities per attack per year + 
5.75 to 11.5 fatalities per attack per year. These ranges, which appear quite 
plausible, might define ranges at which the lone wolf exhibiting a particular level 
of risk aversion could be expected to withdraw (following successful attacks 
generating fatalities within these ranges), at least temporarily, from active pursuit 
of terroristic activity.  
 This theoretical and analytical work may be examined against the 
historical record of lone wolf terrorist incidences. Doing so will give more 
concreteness to the analysis. As the starting point and basis for the analysis, the 
chronology of lone wolf terrorist attacks within the United States and other 
countries for the period 1968 to 2007 (developed by Instituut voor Veiligheids en 
Crisismanagement (2007)) is used. The Instituut voor Veiligheids en 
Crisismanagement (2007) identifies 29 lone wolf terrorists in operation during 
this time period in the United States and a further 38 likely examples of lone wolf 
terrorism in other countries. For the period 1968 to 2007, these 67 lone wolf 
terrorists were responsible for 97 fatalities and 337 injuries in at least 121 separate 
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incidents. The average fatalities per attack per year are 0.0205 which is 
approximate with the lower bound of the theoretical prediction of 0.05 fatalities 
per attack per year (prediction 7). The theoretical analysis and the calculations 
formed on its basis do not generate results that differ markedly from the historical 
record of fatalities associated with lone wolf terrorist incidences.  
 The other principle predictions of the theoretical analysis concern the type 
of incidents attributed to lone wolf terrorists. Lone wolf terrorists, in accordance 
with predictions 4 and 5, have usually been characterised by an attack method 
combination (within a single period) consisting solely of assassination, armed 
attack, bombing, hostage taking or unconventional methods. In the United States, 
armed attacks (shootings) and bombings are the most prominent attack methods 
chosen by lone wolf terrorists and constitute almost all of the recorded incidents. 
This indicates an intermediate to high level of risk seeking preference among 
these lone wolves. Outside of the United States, more variety of attack methods 
has been deployed. Although armed attacks and bombings remain dominant, there 
were 11 hijackings, 3 hostage-takings and 3 arson attacks. This is in accordance 
with predictions 4 and 5 and, in addition, indicates that lone wolves operating 
outside of the United States have tended to be relatively less risk averse (more 
risk seeking). Interestingly, however, hijackings have gradually faded away in 
terms of frequency, which is an indication of a substitution-deterrence effect 
attributable to enhanced airport security.  
 Although it cannot be tested at a high level of rigour, it is possible to 
examine the prediction that satiation could occur at 1.04 fatalities per attack per 
year + 0.44 to 0.88 fatalities per attack per year. In general, the prediction that 
emerges is that satiation of the lone wolf may occur at very low levels and the 
lone wolf may be expected to withdraw temporarily from terrorist activity after 
some threshold is reached. Testing this prediction is not straightforward and we 
rely, for now, on a brief investigation of the specific case of Theodore Kaczynski 
(the Unabomber). This case is particularly well suited to analysis because 
Kaczynski perpetrated his attacks over a long period of time before finally being 
apprehended. The theoretical analysis and the calculations based upon it imply 
satiation and the possible temporary withdrawal from terrorist activities at a very 
low level of fatalities. This prediction characterises Kaczynski very well. In 1987, 
after nine years of perpetrating attacks, Kaczynski became inactive. At the point 
of his becoming inactive, his attacks had generated 0.21 fatalities and injuries per 
attack per year (0.017 fatalities per attack per year and 0.15 fatalities per attack). 
Detailed empirical analysis of the predictions generated by the theoretical 
approach outlined in this paper will shed more light on the choices of individual 
lone wolf terrorists.  
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Conclusions 
 
In this paper an attempt has been made to encompass the lone wolf terroristic 
agent within an economic-analytical framework. In the first instance, the 
application of the orthodox economic approach to the analysis of terrorism was 
explored. For the most part, the conclusions are expected to hold but a number of 
easily identifiable idiosyncrasies that may characterise the lone wolf terrorist 
appear to weaken the strength of the conclusions that can be drawn. In light of 
this, a different approach was proposed. A rational actor framework wherein a 
terroristic agent makes choices on the basis of a preference ordering constructed 
over two moments of the distribution (measured in terms of fatalities generated by 
terrorist attacks) is consistent with the expected utility approach (approximately or 
exactly with quadratic utility) but has the advantage of providing computable 
results as well as being attended by a number of additional theoretical predictions 
for the behaviour of the lone wolf terroristic agent. Seven predictions were 
yielded from the mean-variance theoretical framework and numerical estimates 
were computed as preliminary steps towards the full exploration of the 
implications of the framework. Most importantly, depending on their level of risk 
aversion (or risk seeking), lone wolves are expected to choose assassination, 
armed attack, bombing, hostage taking or unconventional methods. Furthermore, 
within a range of between one and two standard deviations from the mean, it is 
possible that the quadratic utility function will reach a maximum. Following 
attacks of a certain magnitude (in terms of fatalities), it might be expected that the 
lone wolf will withdraw from activity for a period of time. This is something that 
may assist governments and security agencies facing the threat of lone wolf 
terrorism.  
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